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I assess the impact of losing public health insurance on the labor market decisions of women by
examining a series of Medicaid eligibility expansions targeted toward young children. These targeted
expansions severed the historical tie between AFDC and Medicaid eligibility. The reforms allowed a
mother’s earnings to increase without affecting her young children’s public health insurance. Increasing
the income limit for Medicaid resulted in a decrease in AFDC participation and an increase in labor
force participation among these women. The effects were large for ever-married women, but were
negligible for never-married women.The Medicaid Notch, Labor Supply, and Welfare Participation:
Evidence from Eligibility Expansions
1. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. welfare system for single-parent families with children offers four main benefits: cash
assistance through Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), health insurance coverage
through Medicaid, food subsidies through Food Stamps, and public housing.  In the past decade,
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Medicaid benefits have become more important as medical costs have soared while cash benefits have
failed to keep up with inflation. In fiscal year 1991, the combined federal-state Medicaid expenditure of
$21.9 billion on 12.6 million AFDC recipients exceeded cash payments of $20.9 billion to this group
(U.S. House of Representatives 1993). This paper investigates the hypothesis that losing Medicaid
coverage is a deterrent to leaving welfare. If this is true, then proposals which extend health insurance
coverage to children in low- and moderate- income families could have the additional effect of getting
families off the welfare rolls.
Medicaid provides a basic set of free or subsidized medical services to poor, eligible families.
The program is federally subsidized and regulated but administered by the states, which have some
leeway in defining the set of services offered. Traditionally, eligibility for Medicaid has been
contingent on eligibility for AFDC, that is, one simultaneously qualifies for Medicaid and AFDC by
having net income under a state’s income eligibility limit. The health insurance is retained as long as
the AFDC recipient earns less than the “AFDC break-even level,” the point where AFDC benefits are
lost. Medicaid is entirely lost once earned income goes beyond the break-even level, generating a
marginal tax rate in excess of 100 percent.
This paper will explore some recent Medicaid expansions for children that explicitly sever the
link between Medicaid eligibility and AFDC eligibility and generate sizable exogenous shocks to the
budget set of some welfare recipients.  Using recent data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), I
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offer new evidence on Medicaid’s impact on labor force and AFDC participation. I find that the fully2
phased-in Medicaid reforms reduced the probability of participating in AFDC by 1.2 percentage points
and increased the probability of working in the labor force by 0.9 percentage points. The effects of the
reforms were quite strong among divorced and separated women, but not among never-married women.
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 sets up the theoretical framework to analyze
Medicaid’s effect. Section 3 describes the legislative changes used to identify Medicaid’s effect.
Section 4 describes the data extract, various years of the March CPS. Section 5 provides reduced form
evidence of Medicaid’s impact on labor force participation and AFDC participation. Section 6
concludes.
2. THEORETICAL EFFECTS OF MEDICAID
To analyze the effect of Medicaid on labor supply and welfare participation among potential
welfare participants, I use a variant of the static labor supply model, which incorporates taxes and the
welfare system.  Assume that the consumer maximizes utility, U=u(Leisure, Other Goods). She faces a
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constant pretax wage, w . The welfare and tax system create nonlinearities in the budget set. At zero
0
hours of market work, the mother receives a certain level of AFDC and food stamp benefits, known as
the “guarantee,” in addition to Medicaid. Figure 1 illustrates this budget set for a welfare recipient in
Pennsylvania in 1989. As she begins to work, her AFDC and food stamp benefits are taxed away, so
her after-tax wage is w =(1- )w , where   is the marginal tax rate for earning income while on
1 0
AFDC AFDC
AFDC (which varies from 67 to 100 percent).  Once she works more than H , the hours of work
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Breakeven
where the entire AFDC benefit is taxed away, she loses her AFDC eligibility, and therefore her
Medicaid benefits, which creates a dominated part of the budget set. This discontinuous drop in benefits
has been called the “Medicaid notch.” Once the recipient works more than this level of hours, she faces
an after-tax wage of w =(1- )w , where   is the marginal tax rate in the
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federal and state income tax codes. To determine which region of hours is dominated, however, we
would need to know the value of the benefits she received from Medicaid.
As states have expanded eligibility for Medicaid by increasing the income limit to a higher
level than what an AFDC recipient could earn, the notch has moved. The coverage is still means-tested,
but at a potentially higher level than the AFDC income limit. The change in the income limit yields
several reduced form predictions for those eligible for the expansions by changing the budget set as
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.
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Labor force participation increases (or remains unchanged if no behavioral response occurs),
since the new opportunities on the budget set occur where the woman participates. This occurs
because some women who were not initially working before the expansion begin to work. No
one who is currently working should withdraw from the labor force, because that (Leisure,
Other Goods) combination was available before the expansion.
AFDC participation decreases (or remains unchanged if no behavioral response occurs),
because the only new opportunities arise when the woman leaves AFDC.
AFDC participation decreases more than labor force participation increases. This occurs since
some women will be located along the welfare part of the budget set (but not at zero hours of
work) before the expansions, implying participation in both AFDC and the labor force. After
the expansions these people could increase their hours and locate on the post-expansion part of
the budget set, which we observe as exiting AFDC but having no effect on labor force
participation. For women initially at zero hours of work, the two effects should be the same,
since the only new opportunity the expansion offers is to exit AFDC and enter the labor force.
For women initially off welfare, their hours of work may decrease, but they will not participate
in AFDC, which they could have already done. Therefore, in aggregate, the effect on AFDC
participation is larger than the effect on labor force participation.5
The effect on total hours of work is ambiguous. Hours could increase for women initially on
AFDC, but could decrease for women initially off AFDC.
Two other points deserve mention. First, the existence of the Medicaid “notch” is predicated
upon no feasible insurance alternatives for these households.  It may be reasonable to think that with
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the skill mix that the group possesses, the possibility of employer-provided health insurance coverage is
quite low. Second, welfare stigma potentially provides a second explanation for why the effect of
extending Medicaid should be smaller on entry into the labor force than exits from AFDC. Households
that previously worked because they found collecting AFDC very stigmatizing might withdraw from
the labor force when given the opportunity to receive Medicaid without being on AFDC.
3. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND IDENTIFICATION
3.1 Overview of Legislation from 1986 to 1990
The Medicaid expansions were legislated in response to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OBRA) 1981, which severely reduced access to health care services for the poor by placing heavy
restrictions on AFDC eligibility. As a result, nearly 40 percent of working AFDC families were
removed from the welfare rolls and roughly two million people (nearly 500,000 families) lost Medicaid
eligibility between 1979 and 1983. Starting in 1984, and especially from 1986 onward, Congress
attempted to increase access to health care for pregnant women, infants, and children through a series
of Medicaid expansions.  The legislation severed the link between Medicaid eligibility and AFDC
7
eligibility by eliminating Medicaid eligibility criteria related to family structure and an individual
state’s AFDC income eligibility level.
The legislation allowed Medicaid coverage to be means-tested to some percentage of the
federal poverty line (FPL), usually 100 or 133 percent. As illustrated in Figure 2, a MedicaidFIGURE II
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expansion to 133 percent of the FPL would move the Medicaid notch from $9,000 to $13,380. Before
the expansion, this household would lose Medicaid at $9,000 of earnings, and total income does not
reach this level again until gross earnings nearly double.
8
Several pieces of legislation expanded access to health care for children.  In 1986 and 1987
9
federal legislation gave states several options for expanding their Medicaid program, while legislation
in 1989 and 1990 mandated more extensive coverage.  Table 1 illustrates the generosity of the
10
expansions at the beginning, middle, and end of the period that I analyze, by showing the age limit to
qualify for Medicaid and the Medicaid income eligibility limit for an infant (the income limit for older
children was usually lower). The earliest legislation gave states the option to carry out the expansions to
children under 2. The table shows that by January 1988, half the states had expanded eligibility. By the
end of 1989, every state had adopted some form of expansion, although there was a great deal of
across-state variation in Medicaid eligibility, which was based on the age of the child. The later
mandates increased the income threshold to 133 percent and the age limit to 6. Thirty-two states were
required to adjust their income threshold and thirty-seven states were forced to increase their age limit.
Finally, the mandates in 1991 expanded eligibility to children over the age of 6 to 100 percent of the
poverty line. By December 1991, all states extended Medicaid coverage to children up to age 8, though
the income eligibility limits for infants varied substantially.
These reforms resulted in a dramatic increase in Medicaid eligibility and coverage. Figure 3
shows a sharp rise in the number of children covered by the Medicaid expansions (beneficiaries without
cash assistance) starting in 1988, whereas the number of children enrolled in the Medically Needy
program and AFDC program remained quite stable. This data, based on administrative records from the
Health Care Financing Administration, shows that by 1991, three million children were covered by
Medicaid as a result of the expansions. In addition, Currie and Gruber (1994) find that between 1984
and 1992, eligibility for Medicaid increased by 100 percent. By the end of the period,8
TABLE 1
State Medicaid Eligibility Thresholds for Children
          January 1988                  December 1989                 December 1991        
State Age Limit MEDICAID% Age Limit MEDICAID% Age Limit MEDICAID%
Alabama 1 185 8 133
Alaska 2 100 8 133
Arizona 1 100 2 100 8 140
Arkansas 2 75 7 100 8 185
California 5 185 8 185
Colorado 1 75 8 133
Connecticut 0.5 100 2.5 185 8 185
Delaware 0.5 100 2.5 100 8 160
D.C. 1 100 2 100 8 185
Florida 1.5 100 5 100 8 150
Georgia 0.5 100 3 100 8 133
Hawaii 4 100 8 185
Idaho 1 75 8 133
Illinois 1 100 8 133
Indiana 3 100 8 150
Iowa 0.5 100 5.5 185 8 185
Kansas 5 150 8 150
Kentucky 1.5 100 2 125 8 185
Louisiana 6 100 8 133
Maine 5 185 8 185
Maryland 0.5 100 6 185 8 185
Massachusetts 0.5 100 5 185 8 185
Michigan 1 100 3 185 8 185
Minnesota 6 185 8 185
Mississippi 1.5 100 5 185 8 185
Missouri 0.5 100 3 100 8 133
Montana 1 100 8 133
Nebraska 5 100 8 133
Nevada 1 75 8 133
New Hampshire 1 75 8 133
New Jersey 1 100 2 100 8 185
New Mexico 1 100 3 100 8 185
New York 1 185 8 185
North Carolina 1.5 100 7 100 8 185
North Dakota 1 75 8 133
Ohio 1 100 8 133
Oklahoma 1 100 3 100 8 133
Oregon 1.5 85 3 100 8 133
Pennsylvania 1.5 100 6 100 8 133
Rhode Island 1.5 100 6 185 8 185
South Carolina 1.5 100 6 185 8 185
South Dakota 1 100 8 133
Tennessee 1.5 100 6 100 8 185
Texas 3 130 8 185
Utah 1 100 8 133
Vermont 1.5 100 6 225 8 225
Virginia 1 100 8 133
Washington 1.5 100 8 185 8 185
West Virginia 0.5 100 6 150 8 150
Wisconsin 1 130 8 155
Wyoming 1 100 8 133
Note:  The age limit represents the oldest that a child could be (at a given point in time) and still be eligible.  MEDICAID%










Source: Figure prepared by the Congressional Research Service
based on data from HCFA.10
one-third of all children were eligible for Medicaid. They find Medicaid coverage from the expansions
was flat until 1988, and rose steeply thereafter. This dramatic increase in coverage is another reason for
looking at other possible consequences of the reforms, such as the effects on labor supply and AFDC
participation.
3.2 Parameterization of Health Insurance Expansions
The reforms in Medicaid boil down to changing the income limit for eligibility (which I shall
measure as a percentage of the poverty line). Figure 2 illustrates the measure I incorporate: how much
the Medicaid income limit is increased from the reforms over its previous AFDC level. This is
formulated as:
(1) GAIN% = max(MEDICAID% - AFDC%,0)
GAIN% parameterizes the drastic severing of the tie between Medicaid eligibility and AFDC
eligibility. MEDICAID% is the income eligibility limit from the Medicaid reforms, while AFDC% is
the income limit from AFDC. GAIN% can be equal to zero for two reasons. First, the child may be in a
household that is ineligible for the Medicaid expansion (based on the child’s age), so that the link
between AFDC and Medicaid is not severed. Second, the household might be eligible for the
expansion, but MEDICAID% may be less than AFDC%. After the appropriate deductions and tax rates
are accounted for, the income level that a recipient can earn from AFDC% can exceed 100 percent of
the FPL. GAIN% explicitly models the fact that the expansions should have less impact in a generous
AFDC state since the recipient could have worked and earned some amount of money before the
expansion.
Measuring MEDICAID% is straightforward: it is equal to zero if the household is ineligible for
the expansion, while it is equal to some percentage of the FPL (typically 75, 100, 133, or 185 percent)11
if the recipient qualifies for the expansion. AFDC% depends on a state’s need and payment standard,
which are two state-specific income limits used to determine AFDC eligibility. The information used to
compute AFDC% changes over time (through changes in the need and payment standards) as well as
through changes in the ordering of the deductions for welfare payments, known as disregards. It also
varies by family due to family size, work expense deductions, and child care deductions. Furthermore,
the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA) affected the calculation of the AFDC income limit in several
ways. After incorporating this detail, AFDC% is calculated as:
(2) AFDC% = [(PAYMENT/BRR) + DISREGARD + WORKEXP + DAYCARE]/POV
where PAYMENT stands for the state’s payment standard (one of the income limits used to determine
AFDC eligibility), BRR for the benefit reduction rate (which is 2/3 for the first four months of work),
DISREGARD for the standard deduction, WORKEXP for work expenses, DAYCARE for total child-
care deductions, POV for the dollar amount of the FPL (appropriately adjusted for family size, and
inflated by 1.15 for Hawaii and 1.25 for Alaska).  DAYCARE expenses are calculated as:
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(3) DAYCARE = (1 + ½* (post-FSA))*DEDUCTION*CHILDREN
where  (•) is defined as an indicator variable equal to one after the passage of FSA and zero otherwise,
DEDUCTION is the child care expense deduction while on AFDC, and CHILDREN is the number of
children in the family.
3.3 Econometric Model and Identification Strategy
The primary evidence I present on the effect of the Medicaid notch comes from probits that
model labor force and AFDC participation. The model is specified as:12
(4) LFP  =   +  GAIN%  +  X +  TIME +  STATE +  KIDAGE  +  ikjt 0 1 ikjt 2 i 3 t 4 j 5 k ikjt
*
where (4) is the underlying index function for the probit (and i indexes mothers, k indexes the youngest
child’s age, j indexes states, and t indexes time). A similar equation is used with AFDC  on the left-
*
hand side. Here, GAIN% is the independent variable of primary interest (with   hypothesized to be 1
positive here, and negative for AFDC participation). X contains other covariates, including the number i
of children under age 6, mother’s age and its square (divided by 100), mother’s education and its
square, and dummy variables for family size, black, divorced, separated, and residence in a central city.
Dummy variables for time, state, and youngest child’s age are represented by TIME, STATE, and
KIDAGE. In practice we do not observe the underlying value LFP , but instead observe only the ikjt
*
discrete outcome:
(5) LFP  = 1 if LFP 0 ikjt ikjt
*
0 if LFP <0. ikjt
*
Assuming  N(0,1) and denoting  (•) as the cumulative normal function gives the following ikjt
probability:
(6) Prob(LFP ) =  (  +  GAIN%  +  X +  TIME +  STATE +  KIDAGE ). ikjt 0 1 ikjt 2 i 3 t 4 j 5 k
The reforms in Medicaid create three dimensions of variation that I exploit to identify
Medicaid’s effect. The laws create variation in the budget constraint for mothers with children of
different ages within a state, across states, and over time. The most intriguing dimension is within state.
The expansions provided health insurance coverage to a young child that was conditioned on his or her
birthday. By conditioning on the child’s birthday, the expansions create “treatment” and “control”
groups to gauge the effects of moving the income eligibility limit for Medicaid to a higher level. The13
treatment group is families with children fortunate enough to be born after the birthday cutoff, while
the control group is families with children who were born before the birthday cutoff.  To illustrate,
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consider a state that carried out the OBRA 1987 provisions to the maximum extent possible, as soon as
possible. Then, the following mothers with children of different birthdays get the following “treatment”
on July 1, 1988, in that state.
Child’s birthday Child covered by Length of coverage
expansion?
12/25/88 Yes 8 more years
10/1/83 Yes 3.25 more years
9/30/83 or before No 0 years
Besides variation in the eligibility and length of coverage, the laws generate variation in the
income limit where the recipient loses coverage for her children. For instance, after July 1, 1991, the
mother could face the following earnings schedule for losing Medicaid coverage (conditional on her
children being eligible for the expansions):
Child’s age Age 0 Ages 1 to 5 Ages 6 to 18 Ages 19 and over
Percentage of 185 133 100 0
FPL
In other words, a mother with a 5-year-old can earn up to 133 percent of the FPL before losing
Medicaid while a mother with a 6-year-old can only earn up to 100 percent of the FPL.
The expansions also created variation across states and over time, because different states
carried out the expansions at different times. Examining differences in AFDC and labor force
participation across states or over time may not be entirely convincing, however, since other events
might occur simultaneously. For example, changes in macroeconomic conditions over time or variation
in economic conditions across states could offer incentives to participate in AFDC independent of the
Medicaid expansions. By including dummy variables for state, time, and youngest child’s age in14
equation (6), we account for some of these unmodeled stories and obtain the “difference-in-
differences” estimator. While it is hard to indict this estimator, interactions between STATE, TIME,
and KIDAGE could still drive the observational difference. For example, changing economic
conditions may have affected mothers with older children more than mothers with younger children.
Also, some states rebounded from the recession more quickly than others. If these stories are driving
the differences in the outcomes, then we can include second-order interactions of STATE*TIME,
KIDAGE*TIME, and STATE*KIDAGE to gauge the impact of Medicaid. By including these
interactions in equation (6), we obtain the “difference-in-difference-in-differences” estimator.
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This identification strategy represents an important departure from previous work that has tried
to assess Medicaid’s effect. Blank (1989), Winkler (1991) and Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) tried to
identify Medicaid’s effect by valuing health insurance because the tie between AFDC and Medicaid
was much stronger for the periods they examined. Valuing an in-kind benefit such as health insurance
is a daunting task, because Medicaid’s value should incorporate health status, risk aversion, scope of
medical services offered, access to care, and insurance copayments and deductibles. In addition, some
studies have used health status to value Medicaid, but it is likely that this approach attributes changes in
the potential wage and changes in preferences toward work to the value of Medicaid.
4. THE DATA SET
The data set, which consists of repeated cross sections, was constructed using the March
Current Population Survey (CPS), from the years 1989 through 1992. These years cover the period
when the Medicaid expansions occurred. The CPS is a timely, nationally representative survey
interviewing many households (approximately 57,000 per month). Its March annual demographic file
contains retrospective information on labor force participation and welfare participation.  The sample
14
contains 16,062 single mothers between the ages of 18 and 55 with at least one child under 15 present.
1515
I use a smaller range of children’s ages (only up to 14) than previous studies (usually up to 18) for two
primary reasons.  First, during the four-year window that my data spans, 1988 to 1991, the expansions
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never affected children over age 8, so using children up to age 14 should provide an adequate control
for within state variation in the benefit schedule. Second, and more importantly, I was concerned with
the possibility that older teenage children may form their own families and collect welfare benefits
independently of their mother, so that modeling the joint labor supply decision might be appropriate
when older children are present.
To each mother’s record I linked the youngest child’s age, which is used to impute eligibility
and generosity of the expansions (along with time and state of residence). I therefore compare labor
market outcomes of mothers with any child eligible to mothers with no child eligible. The data
concerning the Medicaid expansions was compiled from documentation provided by the
Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, which contains detailed information on the date of
implementation, range of ages the expansions covered, the new Medicaid notch, and any phase-in
schedule for the expansion.
To assign eligibility, it was necessary to impute a birth month and birth year to each child, since
the CPS asks only the child’s age as of March 1 of the survey year. To do this, I assigned each child a
birth month, randomly drawn from the year in which they could have been born, based on a uniform
distribution. This random assignment is a compromise because it induces measurement error in the
independent variable, GAIN%. This measurement error is more important for children born in the year
of some birthday cutoff, who then have a chance of being misclassified, while it is less important for
children born more than one year above or below the cutoff date.
Table 2 shows the means of the variables used in the estimation. Forty percent of children in
these households collect Medicaid, while a smaller fraction of households, 32 percent, participate in16
TABLE 2
Summary Statistics
      All     Never
Female Heads Married Only Divorced Only Separated Only
Obs. 16062 6247 6478 3337
Mother's age 31.5 27.4 34.7 32.9
Youngest child's age 5.74 3.89 7.54 5.73
Oldest child's age 8.47 6.15 10.24 9.38
# children < age 6 0.705 0.96 0.418 0.768
# children   age 6 1.13 0.75 1.38 1.35
Years education <12 0.24 0.31 0.156 0.29
Years education >12 0.32 0.23 0.42 0.28
Black 0.29 0.48 0.13 0.25
White 0.66 0.47 0.82 0.71
North 0.22 0.25 0.18 0.25
South 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.35
West 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.21
Child covered by Medicaid
  through AFDC or expansion 0.40 0.55 0.25 0.39
AFDC participation for
  household 0.32 0.45 0.20 0.33
Employer-provided health
  insurance available? 0.36 0.24 0.50 0.30
Labor force participation 0.68 0.55 0.81 0.65
Child eligible for Medicaid
  expansion based on age and
  the state Medicaid rules at
  the time 0.42 0.57 0.26 0.43
Real earnings
(1987 dollars) 8154 5144 11468 7353
25  percentile 0 0 2062 0
th
50  percentile 5045 947 9099 3996
th
75  percentile 13394 8503 17117 11904
th
90  percentile 21258 15650 25225 19792
th
Source: Author's tabulations of Current Population Survey.17
AFDC. The labor force participation rate for the mothers is 68 percent, and roughly half of those
working, 36 percent, are covered by employer-provided health insurance. While the demographic
makeup stays fairly stable across the years (not shown), columns (2), (3), and (4) show that there are
observable differences between never-married, divorced, and separated mothers. I therefore include
dummy variables for marital status in all specifications. The never-married women are younger and
more likely to participate in welfare than divorced or separated women. Slightly less than one-quarter
of the mothers in the sample did not complete high school, while slightly less than one-third of the
sample attended college.  The table also shows that 42 percent of the sample were eligible for the
17
Medicaid expansion based on the state Medicaid rules, time period, and age of the youngest child (but
not family income). The takeup rate was 29 percent among all newly eligible families, and was 47
percent among newly eligible families that lacked employer-provided health insurance.  These rates
18
are similar to the findings of Currie and Gruber (1994b).
Finally, Table 3 shows the independent variable of policy interest, GAIN%. It is positive for
approximately 16 percent of the sample (compared to the 42 percent who have children who are
eligible for some expansion coverage). Conditional on GAIN% being positive, its mean is 20.8 percent.
When the expansions have “bite,” the notch is moved up, on average, by 20.8 percent of the FPL. The
maximum GAIN% is 85 percent, which helps show that the AFDC% can be quite important in
reducing the generosity of the expansion. This table also shows how GAIN% evolved over time. The
fact that the expansions became more generous is illustrated through the average movement in the
income eligibility limit increasing more than six-fold between 1988 and 1991. In addition, different
regions of the country had different responses to the expansions. Since the South tended to offer less
generous AFDC benefits, it should not be surprising that the expansions had the most impact there.
Finally, many of the women in the sample had no change in their budget set18
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for GAIN%
                             Percentiles                             
Sample  Obs. Mean ( )    10 25 50 75 90
th th th th th
Entire sample 16062 0.0337 0 0 0 0 0.1336
(0.0971)
If eligible for  6782 0.0800 0 0 0 0.1320 0.2779
  expansion (0.1364)
If GAIN% is 2613 0.2077 0.0321 0.1021 0.1833 0.2799 0.4194
 positive (0.1477)
Over time:
 1988 3595 0.0069 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0422)
 1989 4063 0.0152 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0604)
 1990 4163 0.0476 0 0 0 0 0.2083
(0.1145)
 1991 4241 0.0607 0 0 0 0.0272 0.2552
(0.1263)
By region:
 Northeast 3652 0.0091 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0517)
 Midwest 3590 0.0261 0 0 0 0 0.1162
(0.0746)
 South 5433 0.0690 0 0 0 0.0779 0.2738
(0.1371)
 West 3387 0.0118 0 0 0 0 0
(0.0505)
Source: Author's tabulations of Current Population Survey. GAIN%=max{MEDICAID%-AFDC%,0}.
GAIN% is the incentive to leave welfare due to the Medicaid expansions, as measured as a percentage of the
federal poverty level. MEDICAID% is the percentage of the federal poverty level that the recipient could earn
up to from the expansions, typically 100 percent or 133 percent if eligible.19
resulting from the expansions. This should be kept in mind when evaluating the actual changes in labor
force and AFDC participation during the time span.
5. REDUCED FORM RESULTS FROM THE CPS
5.1 Primary Specification: All States
Table 4 presents the primary evidence of the effect of the Medicaid notch on labor force and
AFDC participation, through the coefficient estimate on GAIN%. In these specifications, decoupling
Medicaid from AFDC results in a significant positive effect on labor force participation and a
significant negative effect on AFDC participation.  The estimated effect of the fully phased-in
19
Medicaid expansion is calculated by comparing the actual labor force and AFDC participation in 1991
for the sample (66.5 and 34.8 percent respectively) to the predicted rate when GAIN% is set equal to
zero and evaluated for the 1991 observations (yielding predicted rates of 65.6 and 36.0 percent for the
models that include STATE*TIME effects).  Interestingly, this exercise shows that the actual change
20
in the probability of labor force participation was small: around nine-tenths of 1 percent, which
translates into an increase of 1.4 percent in the labor force pool. The fully phased-in Medicaid reforms
reduced the AFDC caseload by approximately 3.5 percent. This effect is dominated in the aggregate
caseload numbers by the effect of the recession and other factors. Between 1988 and 1991, the average
number of families that participated in AFDC each month increased 17 percent, from 3.74 million to
4.37 million (U.S. House of Representatives 1993). The reason that the fully phased-in expansions did
not generate more exits from the welfare rolls is that only 29 percent of the 1991 observations had their
budget constraint changed. The remaining 71 percent either had a child who was too old for the
expansion or lived in a generous AFDC state.20
TABLE 4
Probit Model from Current Population Survey, 1988 to 1991
Labor Force Participation     AFDC Participation
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)
GAIN% 0.3840 0.4731 -0.5188 -0.6492
(0.1509) (0.1679) (0.1544) (0.1714)
Estimated change in
participation from the
fully phased-in expansions 0.0075 0.0090 -0.0099 -0.0120
# kids < age 6 -0.1382 -0.1392 0.1802 0.1829
(0.0286) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0293)
Mother's age 0.0597 0.0618 -0.0007 -0.0012
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0125)
Age /100 -0.0836 -0.0864 -0.0256 -0.0258
2
(0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0185)
Divorced 0.3863 0.3921 -0.3528 -0.3555
(0.0314) (0.0317) (0.0310) (0.0314)
Separated 0.1742 0.1751 -0.2358 -0.2376
(0.0322) (0.0325) (0.0323) (0.0326)
Black -0.0713 -0.0705 0.2168 0.2205
(0.0301) (0.0304) (0.0301) (0.0303)
Central city -0.2267 -0.2213 0.1889 0.1888
(0.0271) (0.0273) (0.0271) (0.0274)
Education -0.0483 -0.0484 0.1341 0.1335
(0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0219)
Education 0.0086 0.0087 -0.0121 -0.0121
2
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Log-likelihood -8196 -8123 -8311 -8226
STATE*TIME No Yes No Yes
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample size is 16,062 observations. The other covariates
include: a constant and family size dummies ranging from 3 to 12 (size of 2 is omitted). STATE, TIME,
KIDAGE, and KIDAGE*TIME indicators included in all specifications.21
The other covariates enter as expected: the number of children under age 6, the square of the
mother’s age, and the black and central city indicators usually enter the labor force participation
equation as negative and statistically significant. The mother’s age, divorced, separated, and the square
of education enter into the labor force participation equation as positive and significant. These
covariates are similar in significance to Winkler (1991), who uses an earlier year of the CPS. When I
evaluated the marginal effect of these coefficients, the magnitudes were similar to the results from the
linear probability model in column (1) of Table 7. In particular, mother’s age, education and education
squared all increased labor force participation by less than 2 percentage points. Being divorced or
separated (relative to never-married), having one less child under the age of 6, and not living in a
central city all increased the probability of labor force participation by more than 5 percentage points.
Table 5 simulates the change in probability from different policy changes (in percentage points)
generated by the models that include STATE*TIME interactions in the second and fourth columns in
Table 4. Notice that severing the link to AFDC eligibility has stronger effect on reducing AFDC
participation than increasing labor force participation. As shown in Section 2, this is an implication of
the model since the work and welfare decisions are not mutually exclusive: some women who were on
AFDC and working will now leave AFDC, which shows up as no change in labor force participation.
The first row evaluates the effect of increasing GAIN% by 25 percent of the FPL over its
current level. This simulation, applied to the whole sample, increases the probability of labor force
participation by 3.3 percentage points (a 4.9 percent increase in the labor force pool) and decreases the
probability of AFDC participation by 4.6 percentage points (a reduction in the AFDC caseload of 14
percent). The second row presents the estimated change in participation among those for whom the
Medicaid expansions changed the budget constraint, meaning that GAIN% is positive. Among this22
TABLE 5
Estimated Effects of Policy Reforms
Labor Force Participation AFDC Participation
(1) (2)
Increasing GAIN% by 25% from
its current level 0.0332 -0.0461
Estimated change in participation
for those with GAIN%>0 0.0295 -0.0452
Means-test Medicaid at $20,000
instead of 1991 AFDC income
eligibility limit 0.0590 -0.0760
Means-test Medicaid at $15,000
instead of 1991 AFDC income
eligibility limit 0.0170 -0.0230
State Yes Yes
State*Time Yes Yes
Note:  Marginal effects measure change in participation in percentage points from models presented in
columns (2) and (4) of Table 4.  23
group (which is 16 percent of the CPS sample), the expansions increased the probability of working by
3.0 percentage points and decreased the probability of welfare participation by 4.5 percentage points. If
these movements were applied to all female headed households, they would translate into a 14 percent
reduction in the AFDC caseload and into a 4.4 percent increase in the labor force pool. The third and
fourth rows, applied to the 1991 observations only, show the result of two final policy changes: means-
testing Medicaid at $20,000 and $15,000, instead of at the recipient’s current 1991 AFDC income
limit.  If these policy changes were applied to all female headed households, they imply reductions in
21
the AFDC caseload of 22 and 6.6 percent, respectively. Since many recipients did not, in fact, have
their budget constraint changed, these simulations suggest that there is substantial room for additional
reform.
In relation to previous work, the movements from the fully phased-in expansions are larger than
the effects found by either Blank (1989) or Winkler (1991) (who find very small effects), but less than
the effects found by Moffitt and Wolfe (1992). This is not surprising, because the variation that both
Blank and Winkler used, average expenditure, may not capture much of the value of Medicaid to any
specific family, while the health measures used by Moffitt and Wolfe could partly attribute changes in
preferences and changes in the wage that affect labor supply to Medicaid.
Finally, to qualify for AFDC, a recipient faces a benefit reduction rate of 67 percent during the
first four months of work and 100 percent thereafter. Therefore, I have also attempted to use a benefit
reduction rate of 100 percent in constructing GAIN%. While the substantive findings remain
unchanged, the estimated effect from different policy reforms of moving the Medicaid notch falls by
approximately 40 percent. It turns out that using the benefit reduction rate of 67 percent is more
appropriate to model the income limit where Medicaid is lost, however. The Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 allowed Medicaid coverage for an additional nine to fifteen months to former AFDC recipients24
who were disqualified for AFDC (and would therefore lose Medicaid) when the benefit reduction rate
increased from 67 percent to 100 percent.
5.2 Effects of the Expansions on Different Demographic Groups
When targeting a benefit such as Medicaid, it is important to know which demographic groups
respond to the expansions. This section attempts to ask whether GAIN% has a different impact based
on marital status, educational attainment, and age. First, I reestimate the models by marital status. A
priori, there are several competing explanations on which type of single woman should have a larger
response to the expansion. One hypothesis is that GAIN% should be weaker for ever-married women
than for never married since the former are more likely to have health insurance coverage through the
absent father. Only 6.3 percent of never-married women have health insurance coverage through an
absent father, compared to 22 percent of separated women and 34 percent of divorced women (U.S.
House of Representatives 1994). Since ever-married women are more likely to have health insurance
coverage, moving the Medicaid notch might be less important for them. On the other hand, being both
never-married and a mother could proxy for long-term welfare dependency. If this is the case, then one
could reasonably expect the coefficient on GAIN% for never-married women to be smaller because it
takes more drastic changes in the budget constraint to remove them from welfare. Being never married
could also proxy for lower earnings prospects and lower levels of nonlabor income. This too could lead
to a smaller effect because the never-married mother might not even be able to attain a level of
earnings to remove herself from AFDC. Thus moving the Medicaid notch may not matter, because the
notch was above the maximum earnings level she could attain from full-time work.
First, I stratify the sample by marital status, and reestimate the participation equations for the
models that include STATE*TIME interactions. Stratifying seems reasonable, because there are several
plausible stories for why the independent variables should affect labor force and AFDC participation
differently based on marital status. For instance, being both black and divorced may signal something25
different about a woman’s outside source of income than being black and never married, white and
divorced, or white and never married.
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Table 6 shows that the results for labor force participation are dramatic: the fully phased-in
expansions had strong effects on ever-married women, and no effect on never-married women. The
labor force pool increased 1.6 percent, and the AFDC caseload fell by 4.6 percent for ever-married
women. On the other hand, the coefficient on GAIN% is insignificant and negative for never-married
women’s labor force participation. In addition, the AFDC caseload fell by only 1.7 percent. If the
interpretation of welfare dependency is correct, these findings suggest that the health insurance reform
might be a useful avenue off of welfare for short-term participants, but would have little impact on
long-term participants.
The findings by stratifying on education and age are also consistent with the above explanation
concerning welfare dependency. When I stratify on educational attainment (less than high school, some
high school, completed high school, and more than high school), I find that the expansions have little
effect on those with less than a high school diploma. Low levels of education are likely to be correlated
with long-term welfare dependence. The expansions have a large effect on those with a high school
diploma, and little effect on those with more than a high school education. The results of stratifying by
age groups (less than 25, ages 25 to 29, ages 30 to 34, and over age 34) show weaker effects of the
expansions on the youngest women.
5.3 Difference-in-difference-in-differences Specification
To gauge the importance of omitting KIDAGE*STATE interactions in the models presented in
previous tables, Table 7 presents the results of a linear probability model that includes
KIDAGE*STATE interactions.  One source of bias by omitting KIDAGE*STATE interaction could
23
be the effect of child care arrangements or child care prices on labor force and AFDC participation.26
TABLE 6
Probit Estimates from Current Population Survey, 1988 to 1991
      Labor Force Participation                AFDC Participation         
Ever married Never married Ever married Never married
       (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)
GAIN% 1.0204 -0.0239 -0.9946 -0.3537
(0.2479) (0.2568) (0.2543) (0.2586)
Estimated change in
participation from fully
phased-in expansions 0.0120 -0.0030 -0.0120 -0.0080
Increase GAIN% by
25% from its current
level 0.0609 -0.0019 -0.0606 -0.0287
# kids < age 6 -0.0951 -0.1687 0.0956 0.2166
(0.0433) (0.0423) (0.0432) (0.0432)
Mother's age 0.0505 0.0732 -0.0650 0.0409
(0.0187) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0205)
Age /100 -0.0750 -0.0898 0.0610 -0.0955
2
(0.0260) (0.0323) (0.0268) (0.0329)
Black -0.0622 -0.1221 0.2688 0.1668
(0.0447) (0.0436) (0.0444) (0.0435)
Central city -0.2282 -0.2202 0.2262 0.1345
(0.0372) (0.0422) (0.0374) (0.0422)
Education -0.0223 -0.1055 0.0815 0.2203
(0.0273) (0.0375) (0.0280) (0.0364)
Education 0.0073 0.0125 -0.0098 -0.0163
2
(0.0012) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0017)
Log-likelihood -4433 -3541 -4498 -3557
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Marginal effects measure change in participation in percentage
points. The sample size is 9,815 observations for the ever-married group and 6,247 observations for the never-
married group. The other covariates include: a constant and family size dummies ranging from 3 to 12 (size of
2 is omitted). STATE, TIME, KIDAGE, STATE*TIME, and KIDAGE*TIME indicators included in all
specifications.27
TABLE 7
Linear Probability Model from Current Population Survey, 1988 to 1991
      Labor Force Participation                AFDC Participation         
       (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)
     DDD        DDD
GAIN% 0.2444 0.3215 -0.3527 -0.4195
(0.0492) (0.0608) (0.0483) (0.0595)
# kids < age 6 -0.0962 -0.0919 0.1317 0.1283
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0084) (0.0086)
Mother's age 0.0127 0.0131 0.0080 0.0093
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0037)
Age /100 -0.0203 -0.0210 -0.0144 -0.0162
2
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0053) (0.0053)
Divorced 0.1092 0.1086 -0.0994 -0.1022
(0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0096) (0.0096)
Separated 0.0506 0.0523 -0.0644 -0.0699
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0104)
Black -0.0305 -0.0295 0.0790 0.0759
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0092)
Central city -0.0747 -0.0753 0.0659 0.0684
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0083)
Education 0.0205 0.0175 0.0060 0.0100
(0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0064) (0.0063)
Education 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0021
2
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
R 0.2039 0.2371 0.1974 0.2365
2
STATE*KIDAGE No Yes No Yes
Notes: Huber standard errors are in parentheses. The other covariates include a constant, and family size
dummies ranging from 3 to 12 (size of 2 is omitted). STATE, TIME, KIDAGE, STATE*TIME, and
KIDAGE*TIME indicators included in all specifications.28
Clearly, child care affects the labor force participation of mothers with young children differently than
mothers with older children, and this market could vary considerably by state. By including
STATE*TIME and KIDAGE*TIME interactions, columns (1) and (3) are the analog to columns (2)
and (4) in Table 4. I also include family size, number of children under age 6, mother’s age and its
square, mother’s education and its square, and dummy variable for black, central city, divorced, and
separated in all specifications. Columns (2) and (4) build upon these models by including
KIDAGE*STATE interactions, which corresponds to the difference-in-difference-in-differences
(DDD) estimator. Columns (1) and (3) tell much the same story as the previous probit models: moving
the Medicaid income eligibility limit continues to have a significant positive effect on labor force
participation and a significant negative effect on AFDC participation. Moving from column (1) to (2),
and from (3) to (4), the coefficient on GAIN% gets stronger from including the KIDAGE*STATE
interactions. In particular, the coefficient on labor force participation increases considerably.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has shown that decoupling Medicaid eligibility from AFDC eligibility significantly
affects labor supply and welfare participation. Using recent Medicaid health insurance expansions for
children which severed the link to AFDC, I show that a substantial decrease in the AFDC caseload
could occur from completely severing the link between AFDC and Medicaid eligibility. The recent law
changes reduced the probability of AFDC participation by 1.2 percentage points. The results also show
that means-testing Medicaid $15,000 or $20,000 instead of the AFDC limit (which was $7,440 in the
average state in 1991) could result in more substantial outflows from AFDC. While my findings would
suggest that the AFDC caseload should have decreased, the caseload actually increased. At least two
factors are responsible for this. First, worsening economic conditions at the state and national levels
increased the welfare caseload. Second, not all families were eligible for the reforms. Moreover, even29
among those who were eligible, the budget constraint might not have been drastically changed. In the
aggregate numbers, these factors mask the importance of health insurance in the decision to leave
welfare.
These findings have consequences for the cost of health care reform. Expanding eligibility for
Medicaid could result in reduced expenditure for current welfare recipients by encouraging them to exit
AFDC. These exits could reduce current AFDC expenditure and result in some growth in the taxable
base due to increased hours of work. Several notes of caution are appropriate, however. While
reductions in the welfare rolls may be possible from severing the link between Medicaid and AFDC,
such an expansion presents new work disincentives for households initially off of welfare (for both
single- and dual-earner families). This could discourage work and reduce the taxable base. More
importantly, the government would be responsible for paying the health care costs for newly eligible
children.
The reforms in Medicaid during the 1980s had consequences on three other outcomes as well.
First, the reforms severed the link to another AFDC requirement, family structure. Yelowitz (1995)
finds that severing this link encourages marriage. He also finds outflows from marriage, however, by
changing the single woman’s budget constraint. Second, the expansion of health insurance for both
pregnant women and for children could affect child health. Currie and Gruber (1994a, 1994b) find that
a 20 percentage-point increase in eligibility for women of childbearing age was associated with a
decrease in infant mortality of 7 percent. Among children, extending Medicaid was associated with
large increases in care for children delivered at physicians’ offices. Third, the reforms might have had
an effect on the demand for private insurance. Cutler and Gruber (1995) find evidence that public
insurance crowds out private insurance.3031
APPENDIX A: Legislative Changes in the 1980s
Sixth Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1986 (SOBRA 86): Permitted states to extend Medicaid
coverage to children under age 2 with incomes below 100 percent of the federal poverty line effective
April 1987. Beginning July 1988, states could increase the age level by one in each fiscal year until all
children under age 5 were included.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1987 (OBRA 87): Effective July 1988, states could
immediately cover children under age 5 (rather than phasing in coverage) who were born after
September 1983. Effective October 1988, states could expand coverage to children under age 8.
Allowed states to extend Medicaid eligibility for infants up to 185 percent of the federal poverty level.
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 1988 (MCCA 88): Required states to cover infants on a
phased-in schedule: to 75 percent of the federal poverty level, effective July 1989 and to 100 percent,
effective July 1990.
Family Support Act, 1988 (FSA 88): Effective April 1990, required states to continue Medicaid
coverage for twelve months for families who received AFDC in three of the previous six months, but
became ineligible for assistance because of increased earnings. Families whose incomes exceeded 185
percent of the federal poverty level would not qualify. Families with incomes between 100 and 185
percent of the poverty guidelines could be charged a premium during the second six months.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1989 (OBRA 89): Required states to extend Medicaid coverage
to all children under age 6 with family incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level. Effective
April 1990.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 1990 (OBRA 90): Starting July 1991, states are required to
cover all children under age 19 who were born after September 1983, to 100 percent of the federal
poverty level.3233
APPENDIX B: Construction of AFDC% Variable
This appendix explains the construction of AFDC%. This example follows the U.S. House of
Representatives (1993). Under AFDC, each state establishes a “need standard” and a “payment
standard” (which may be equal to or lower than the need standard); these standards are adjusted by
family size. To receive AFDC payments, a family must pass two income tests, a gross income test and
a countable income test. Families with gross incomes that exceed 185 percent of the state’s need
standard are ineligible for AFDC. Benefits are generally computed by subtracting countable income
(i.e., gross income less certain amounts known as disregards) from the payment standard. The
maximum benefit, which is the amount paid to a family with no other income, may be lower than the
payment standard; as of January 1, 1992, this was true for nine states.
The gross income test is
(A1) Gross Income   (1.85*Need Standard).
To be eligible for an actual payment, the family’s counted income also be below the state’s payment
standard. Counted (“net”) income test:
(A2) Net Income = (Gross Income - Deductions)   Payment Standard,
which implies,
(A3) Gross Income   (Payment Standard + Deductions).
AFDC% is then determined by minimum of equations (A1) and (A3):
(A4) AFDC% = min{1.85*Need Standard, Payment Standard + Deductions}/POV
where POV stands for the poverty limit in dollars. Equation (A3) is further complicated because the
treatment of deductions has changed over time, and varies by the number of months that a recipient has
been off of welfare. To show this, the following table taken from the U.S. House of Representatives
(1993), illustrates the calculation on an AFDC payment during different regimes. To calculate the
Medicaid notch, we would find the level of gross earnings such that net countable income is zero.
Consider the column containing information on the first 4 months after the Family Support Act
is enacted. To calculate the income level where Medicaid eligibility is lost (based on the payment
standard), we find the level of net countable income that equals the payment standard.
(A5) (Gross Income - Initial Disregards) - 1/3*(Gross Income - Initial Disregards)
 - Child Care = Payment Standard
Solving this in terms of Gross Income gives us:
(A6) Gross Income = 3/2*(Payment Standard + Child Care) + Initial Disregards.
For the $680 payment standard, and $100 child care costs, the Medicaid notch is $1,290 per
month based on the payment standard. If the need standard is greater than $697 (=1290/1.85) then the
payment standard binds. Otherwise the Medicaid notch is simply given by equation (A1). This
corresponds to equation (2) in the text. One could perform this same exercise for the first 4 months
after the Deficit Reduction Act.34
The need and payment standards vary by state, time, and family size. The information on the
need and payment standards (as of July 1 of each year) was obtained from documents provided by the
National Governors Association for the years 1988 to 1991.
Calculation of Monthly AFDC Benefits for a Worker with Low Earnings
under Deficit Reduction Act and Current Law
 Deficit Reduction Act (DEFRA)          Current law (FSA)
                  1984                                                          
First 4 After 4 After 12 First 4 After 4 After 12
months months months months months months
Income
  Gross earnings 581 581 581 581 581 581
  EITC ... ... ... ... ... ...
    Gross income 581 581 581 581 581 581
Disregards
  Initial disregards -105 -105 -75 -120 -120 -90
1
  One-third of rest NA NA NA -154 NA NA
  Child care -100 -100 -100 -100 -100 -100
  One-third of rest -125 NA NA NA NA NA
  Other expenses NA NA NA NA NA NA
    Total disregards 330 205 175 374 220 190
    Net countable income 251 376 406 207 361 391
AFDC benefits:
  $680 payment standard 429 304 274 473 319 289
  $367 payment standard 116 0 0 160 6 0
2
DEFRA: standard work expense deduction of $75 plus $30 disregard in first 12 months, FSA:
1
standard work expense deduction of $90 plus $30 disregard in first 12 months. Before the FSA, the
maximum child care deduction was $160, and after the FSA, $175 for children age 2 and over. For
children under age 2, it was $200.
To receive an AFDC check, the benefit amount must equal at least $10.
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Moffitt 1992 presents a thorough and readable discussion of the welfare system. Throughout
1
the paper, I use the terms “AFDC” and “welfare” interchangeably.
Three previous studies, Blank 1989, Winkler 1991, and Moffitt and Wolfe 1992 have tried to
2
identify Medicaid’s effect on labor supply and welfare participation, but have not arrived at a clear
consensus.
Blank (1989) and Winkler (1991) present careful theoretical expositions on how Medicaid
3
affects labor supply.
 is also known as the benefit reduction rate. It is meant to account for other taxes and
4
AFDC
subsidies that interact with the welfare system, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit, state taxes, and
federal taxes. Also note that nonlabor and nontransfer income are excluded, since AFDC taxes them at
100 percent with no deductions.
Since food stamp eligibility is not tied to the AFDC income eligibility level, the budget set has
5
more kinks than shown in the figures. This does not change any prediction tested in this paper,
however, so it is not modeled in this section, but is controlled for in the estimation with year dummies.
Short, Cantor, and Monheit (1988) examine the dynamics of Medicaid enrollment. While 38
6
percent of the sample who were initially on welfare left over the next two years, only 43 percent of this
subgroup were covered by private health insurance. This probably represents an upper bound on the
availability of employer-provided health insurance for AFDC recipients.
While pregnant women receive services only related to pregnancy or complications from the
7
pregnancy, infants and children receive full coverage equivalent to that received by AFDC recipients.
These numbers are taken from U.S. House of Representatives, Background Material and Data
8
on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means (1991), p. 590. The state
average Medicaid expenditure per welfare household was, for example, $2,304 in Pennsylvania for a
Notes36
mother with two children in 1989.
Appendix A provides a detailed account of the legislation.
9
Two other relevant reforms were enacted. The Family Support Act (FSA) 1988 gave families
10
twelve months of transitional Medicaid coverage for those leaving AFDC due to an earnings or hours
increase. Previously the coverage had been four months. Another piece of legislation, the Medicare
Catastrophic Care Act (MCCA) mandated that states could not cut their AFDC benefit or eligibility
levels to finance the Medicaid expansion.
Appendix B discusses the construction of AFDC% in some detail.
11
This identification strategy is similar to that of Krueger and Pischke (1992), who examine the
12
effect of Social Security on retirement using differential generosity of the program across cohorts based
on their year of birth.
Gruber (1994) and Gruber and Poterba (1994) employ this type of identification strategy in
13
other contexts.
Both the AFDC and labor force participation questions correspond to the previous year,
14
though they are treated as contemporaneous in the estimation.
Where “single” means divorced, separated, or never married. This criterion is not immune to
15
the criticism that marital status is itself endogenous to the structure of the welfare system, so that the
sample should consist of all women, not just single women. However, to more closely replicate
previous work, I consider only single women. Ellwood and Bane (1985) and Yelowitz (1995) examine
the impact of welfare benefits on marriage decisions.
In addition, I excluded any mother who was receiving Medicare (presumably her status was
16
the result of a coding error or some unusual qualifying event, like end-stage renal disease or disability,
since few people under age 65 qualify for Medicare). I also excluded the mothers who were veterans, to
preclude the possibility of military health insurance coverage. Finally, I excluded mothers who were in37
“ill-health” or had some “other personal handicap in finding a job” during the survey week of the CPS.
These exclusions are rather trivial and resulted in few deletions.
The March 1992 CPS modified the classification of years of education, grouping together 1 to
17
4 years of schooling, 5 to 6, and 7 to 8. In these cases, I assigned each observation the highest number
of years of schooling. The vast majority of the observations did not fall into these groupings, however,
and the 1992 CPS still disaggregated for grades 9 and above.
The takeup rate among newly eligible recipients is calculated by dividing the fraction of the
18
CPS sample that participates in Medicaid (but is not participating in AFDC), 10.7 percent, by the
fraction of the sample that is eligible for the Medicaid expansions (but is not participating in AFDC),
36.5 percent. A similar calculation is done for those who do not participate in AFDC and lack
employer-provided health insurance.
In alternative specifications, I have examined stigma-related exits from AFDC by including a
19
dummy variable for eligibility (ELIG) and an interaction between ELIG and GAIN%. We would
expect the coefficient on ELIG to be negative in the AFDC participation equation if mothers exited
AFDC (even if GAIN% was equal to zero) due to lower stigma from participating in Medicaid only
after the expansions. These specifications did not change the results on GAIN% and did not indicate
significant differences in stigma between AFDC and Medicaid participation.
The predicted probability was calculated for each individual and averaged over the entire
20
sample. The caseload change was calculated as the change in participation (in percentage points)
divided by the average level of participation in 1991.
Thus, GAIN% is set equal to the difference between $20,000 or $15,000 and the AFDC
21
income eligibility limit, and then divided by the poverty line.
For instance, my tabulations of the CPS indicate that 21 percent of black ever-married
22
mothers received some child support income, 9 percent of black never-married mothers, 43 percent of38
white ever-married mothers, and 5.3 percent of white never-married mothers. Thus there could be
important, unmodeled differences across race/marital status cells.
It was computationally cumbersome to include a full set of KIDAGE*STATE interactions in
23
a probit model. I have estimated such a model for the five largest states in my sample, with similar
results.39
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